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Voluntary Changes in Accounting Principle:
Literature Review, Descriptive Data, and Opportunities for Future Research
ABSTRACT
Voluntary changes in accounting principle represent explicit and fundamental decisions by
managers to exercise accounting discretion. This paper develops an organizing framework to
review prior literature on voluntary changes, provides descriptive insights on contemporary
changes, and identifies opportunities for future research on voluntary changes. The voluntary
change literature is robust and has examined many questions using data prior to the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We find that contemporary voluntary changes often vary across the
pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods by the materiality of their income effect,
issue type, and justifications provided by managers, suggesting that manager use of voluntary
changes has evolved over time. Our future research opportunities consider potential determinants
of voluntary changes including strategic incentives, environmental conditions, and manager
characteristics, as well as the potential direct or moderating role of corporate governance and
auditors on manager use of voluntary changes. They also consider user reactions to voluntary
changes. By providing insight into both extant voluntary change research and the contemporary
use of voluntary changes, our study informs standards setters who grant managers the ability to
exercise this form of accounting discretion, as well as researchers who plan to study accounting
choice through voluntary changes.

Keywords: Voluntary Changes; Accounting Standards; Auditor-Client Interactions
Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.

Voluntary Changes in Accounting Principle:
Literature Review, Descriptive Data, and Opportunities for Future Research
1.

Introduction
This paper develops an organizing framework to review prior literature on voluntary

changes in accounting principle (voluntary changes), provides descriptive insights on
contemporary voluntary changes, and identifies opportunities for future research.1 Standards
setters allow managers to change accounting methods from one acceptable method to another
acceptable and preferable method through a voluntary change (FASB 2010). Voluntary changes
have received attention in the popular press after companies such as AT&T and Verizon elected
to recognize pension gains and losses in the year they occur rather than amortizing the gains and
losses over time, decisions that impacted the financial statements of each company by billions of
dollars (Rapoport 2011). For decades, researchers and popular press commentators have
expressed skepticism about managers’ motivations for voluntary changes and concern about the
effects of changes on the stock market (e.g., Bremser 1975; Rapoport 2011).
This paper’s focus on voluntary changes is important for several reasons. First, voluntary
changes represent a fundamental form of discretion conferred by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) to managers in order to maintain the decision usefulness of financial
statements. That is, the ability to make voluntary changes allows managers to ensure that the
financial statements best reflect economic reality when circumstances change. Second, voluntary
changes provide unique, publicly available evidence on managers’ use of discretion. In this way,
voluntary changes are similar to other data in the accounting literature that are not high in

1

Although we refer to voluntary changes in accounting principle as voluntary changes, prior studies use various
terms such as “accounting changes,” “accounting method changes,” “accounting procedure changes,” “accounting
procedure choice,” “changes in accounting techniques,” “changes in accounting policy,” and “discretionary
accounting changes.”
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frequency but provide explicit insight into an important action or decision, removing the need for
researchers to infer, estimate, or proxy (e.g., Acito, Burks, and Johnson 2009; Keune and
Johnstone 2012). Further, prior literature provides evidence that voluntary changes are often
quantitatively or qualitatively material (Pincus and Wasley 1994; SEC 1999). For example,
managers have used voluntary changes opportunistically to meet debt covenant calculations (e.g.,
Sweeney 1994; Beatty and Weber 2003), to smooth income (e.g., Moses 1987; Elliott and
Philbrick 1990), and to minimize poor performance (e.g., Kaplan and Roll 1972; Keating and
Zimmerman 2000). Finally, in line with these observations on the materiality of voluntary
changes, prior literature also provides some evidence that the market responds when companies
make voluntary changes (e.g., Harrison 1977; Dharan and Lev 1993).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on voluntary changes.
Section 3 develops an organizing framework and extensively reviews the literature beginning in
the early 1970s through 2016, although the study of voluntary changes declines around the late
1990s. Section 4 provides descriptive evidence on voluntary changes from 1995-2013 to gain
insight on contemporary trends. Our descriptive analysis considers two significant exogenous
events, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and SFAS No. 154, Accounting Changes and Error
Corrections (FASB 2005), that could impact managers’ use of voluntary changes. More
specifically, we partition our data into three periods: 1) years prior to SOX, 2) years after SOX
but before the implementation of SFAS No. 154, and 3) years after SFAS No. 154. We find that
voluntary changes often differ across these periods in terms of the materiality of income effects,
the issue types of changes, and justifications provided by managers. Section 5 then uses our
organizing framework to identify opportunities for future research on the determinants of
manager use of voluntary changes (i.e., environmental conditions, strategic incentives, and
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manager characteristics), the potential moderating role of corporate governance and auditors on
such use, and user reactions to voluntary changes. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Our paper informs both standards setters and researchers. With regards to standards
setters, our literature review and descriptive analyses provide insight into the extant literature on
voluntary changes, as well as changes in the use of and justifications for voluntary changes
following SOX and SFAS No. 154. In this way, our paper informs the FASB’s postimplementation reviews of SFAS No. 154, as well as U.S. and international accounting standards
setters’ consideration of disclosure standards. With regards to researchers, several factors
including the age of published studies, the recent popular press interest in voluntary changes, and
the ever-changing financial reporting environment suggest that the nature of voluntary changes
may have evolved over recent years, motivating the reexamination of fundamental questions
studied in prior research. In addition, advances in publicly available data and the sophistication
of accounting research enable researchers to ask and answer questions that could not be
considered in prior research. Our paper assists researchers who are planning to study this
fundamental form of manager discretion by identifying many opportunities for future research on
voluntary accounting changes and providing baseline knowledge on prior literature and
contemporary data available for study. Voluntary changes offer rich opportunities for future
research, particularly as we approach the implementation of significant principles-based
accounting guidance such as Revenue from Contracts with Customers (Topic 606).
2. Background on voluntary changes
The FASB faces a trade-off between creating standards with fewer rules that preparers
could apply inconsistently and creating standards with more rules that could become too
complex (Nelson 2003). The primary principle the FASB considers in standard setting is

3

decision usefulness for existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors (FASB
2010). However, since standards setters cannot foresee all circumstances that could arise,
standards without discretion will not achieve decision usefulness for all companies. As the
continued use of the same accounting method may not be as appropriate when company
circumstances change, the FASB allows managers the discretion to switch from one acceptable
accounting method to a more preferable method that best fits a company’s current circumstances.
Managers can voluntarily change to an acceptable alternative accounting method if they
can justify that the new principle is preferable. For fiscal years beginning on or prior to
December 15, 2005, APB Opinion No. 20 (1971) requires managers to report the cumulative
effect of the change on prior periods as a separate income statement line item.2 For fiscal years
beginning after December 15, 2005, SFAS No. 154 (now ASC 250-10) requires managers to
record voluntary changes through retrospective application, applying the new principle as if it
had always been used (FASB 2005).3 Retrospective application is similar to restatement in that
both approaches require revision of prior financial statements, but retrospective application is
distinguished from restatement in that restatement corrects prior period errors (FASB 2005).
Managers disclose the nature of and justification for a voluntary change in the notes to
the financial statements (FASB 2016a). In public company 10-Qs or 10-Ks, the company’s
auditor also provides a preferability letter stating the auditor’s agreement that the new principle
is preferable based on the company’s facts, circumstances, and justifications (FASB 2016b). If
the change has a material effect on the financial statements, the auditor recognizes the change in
an explanatory paragraph to the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2008). Exhibits 1 and 2 illustrate

2

APB Opinion No. 20 requires restatement for voluntary changes from the LIFO inventory method to another
method, in the method for long-term construction-type contracts, or from the full cost method of accounting.
3
When it is impracticable to apply the change to any prior period, companies apply the change prospectively from
the earliest date practicable.

4

disclosures of pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SFAS No. 154 voluntary changes for PPL
Corporation and Honeywell International, respectively.
[Insert Exhibit 1 about Here]
[Insert Exhibit 2 about Here]
SFAS No. 154 also provides reporting guidance for accounting changes other than
voluntary changes in accounting principle, including mandatory changes and changes in
accounting estimate. Although these other types of changes are not the focus of our study, we
briefly describe these changes and their reporting requirements to distinguish them from
voluntary changes in accounting principle. When the FASB issues a codification update that
requires companies to change to a new accounting principle, managers use the transition
guidance provided by the new update or retrospective application of the accounting principle
required by SFAS No. 154 to report this mandatory change (now ASC 250-10).4
A change in accounting estimate occurs when managers identify new information that
necessitates modification of the valuation of assets or liabilities such as uncollectible accounts,
inventory, and the service lives and salvage values of depreciable assets. Changes in accounting
estimate are applied prospectively (i.e., in the period of the change and/or future periods). In
some circumstances, a change in accounting estimate can be difficult to distinguish from a
change in accounting principle. Prior to SFAS No. 154, changes in depreciation, amortization,
and depletion methods required a cumulative effect adjustment and an auditor preferability letter,
as the preceding authoritative literature categorized these changes as voluntary changes in
accounting principle. In contrast, SFAS No. 154 (ASC 250-10-45-19) categorizes changes in

A mandatory change could include any update to the Codification that “requires use of a new accounting principle,
interprets an existing principle, expresses a preference for an accounting principle, or rejects a specific principle”
(ASC 250-10-45-13). Mandatory changes do not require a preferability letter (Deloitte 2016).
4
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depreciation, amortization, and depletion methods (e.g., straight line to accelerated method) as a
change in estimate effected by a change in principle, which requires managers to apply the
change prospectively and removes the requirement to file an auditor preferability letter (EY
2016). In summary, our study focuses on voluntary changes in accounting principle reported in
auditor preferability letters, which are distinct from changes in estimate effected by a change in
principle, mandatory changes, and changes in estimate.
3. Prior literature
We review representative studies from the published literature on voluntary changes
through 2016 to provide insight into the nature and findings of the questions studied using these
data. Figure 1 presents an organizing framework for our review of prior research and our
identification of opportunities for future research. Figure 1 boxes with thick borders and
categories in bold font indicate topics that are not examined in prior research but are
opportunities for future research. First, we consider environmental determinants for manager use
of voluntary changes including factors such as regulation, standards, company and industry
characteristics, and the economy. Then, we consider strategic incentives as determinants of
manager use of voluntary changes (i.e., managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial
distress; company and managerial reputation; industry peers). In addition, managerial
characteristics could serve as determinants of managerial decisions regarding voluntary changes
while the company’s corporate governance and audit firm could serve as moderators of these
decisions. The outcome of the voluntary change process leads to financial reporting choices from
managers and auditors. Ultimately, the financial reporting outcomes of the voluntary change
process are consumed by financial reporting users including the stock market and analysts.
[Insert Figure 1 about Here]
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In a separate panel for each of the following sections, Table 1 lists relevant studies in
chronological order and summarizes information from these studies. Some study samples include
more than one accounting technique (e.g., voluntary and mandatory changes). The table denotes
studies that examine techniques in addition to voluntary changes in accounting principle.
[Insert Table 1 about Here]
3.1

Environment – tax regulation
The literature on voluntary changes has extensively examined the association between

inventory method changes to LIFO and tax savings. Voluntary changes to the LIFO method for
inventory represent approximately 38 percent of all voluntary changes between 1969 and 1988,
and most of these changes occurred in 1974 and 1975 (Pincus and Wasley 1994). Researchers
consistently find that LIFO adoption is due to tax savings (Morse and Richardson 1983; Dopuch
and Pincus 1988; Pincus and Wasley 1996). In addition, the evidence suggests that companies do
not switch to LIFO immediately but wait until the tax savings become sufficiently large before
switching methods (Morse and Richardson 1983; Dopuch and Pincus 1988).
The only other studies examining the effect of specific tax regulations consider whether
the regulations lead to opportunistic voluntary changes. For example, Bartley and Chen (1992)
examine voluntary changes after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and conclude that managers make
changes to maintain book-tax conformity but not to reduce the company’s exposure to the
alternative minimum tax. Keating and Zimmerman (2000) examine the 1981 tax law that
implemented fixed depreciation schedules and provide evidence of a decrease in the number of
depreciation method changes after the law went into effect. Their results are consistent with
managers making larger income-increasing depreciation method changes when company
performance is lower, suggesting that opportunism could drive at least some voluntary changes.

7

3.2

Environment – company and industry
Prior literature has only studied company characteristics related to financial performance.

Bremser (1975) considers earnings per share and return on investment and finds that companies
with poor performance make voluntary changes more frequently. Similarly, Lilien, Mellman, and
Pastena (1988) examine companies with performance at the top and bottom of the industry in
terms of total shareholder return. They find that companies at the bottom of the industry are more
likely than successful companies to improve income through accounting changes.
3.3

Environment – economy
Prior studies on specific economic factors and voluntary changes primarily focus on

drivers of the decision to adopt the LIFO method for valuing inventory. Dopuch and Pincus
(1988) suggest that high inflationary periods result in greater tax savings from LIFO adoption as
the study examines the association between tax savings and LIFO adoption (see Section 3.1). In
addition, Pincus and Wasley (1994) find evidence of a positive correlation between LIFO
adoptions and inflation rates (rather than tax savings), which suggests that managers choose
LIFO to realize tax savings. The exception to the LIFO focus of economic factors studies is
Frishkoff (1970) who examines all voluntary changes rather than only changes to LIFO. He finds
evidence of companies making voluntary changes to minimize earnings decreases in years of
economic uncertainty and inflation.
3.4

Strategic incentives – managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial distress
We next consider literature on managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial distress.

Watts and Zimmerman (1986) developed positive accounting theory to predict how managers
choose accounting policies in response to the use of accounting information in contracts. The
bonus plan hypothesis from positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1978) suggests
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that managers choose accounting policies that are favorable for calculating compensation under
bonus plans. The literature generally provides evidence that voluntary changes are not associated
with the existence of manager bonus plans, which is inconsistent with the bonus plan hypothesis
(Holthausen 1981; Hunt 1985; Ramanan and Balachandran 1993). Healy, Kang, and Palepu
(1987) provide evidence that while bonuses are commonly calculated using the new rather than
the old method, switching from accelerated to straight-line depreciation or from FIFO to LIFO
has little to no effect on manager compensation, especially in comparison to industry-wide and
economy-wide impacts. Abdel-Khalik (1985) similarly finds that a switch from FIFO to LIFO
does not affect manager compensation. In contrast, Ramanan and Balachandran (1993) find that
managers receive additional short-term compensation when changing to a policy of capitalizing
interest on long-term construction projects, but the full evidence from the study does not support
the bonus plan hypothesis. The reasoning for the lack of findings related to bonus contracts and
voluntary changes might be provided by Abdel-Khalik, Chi, and Ghicas (1987) who find that
compensation changes are associated with the real (i.e., cash flow) rather than the income
consequences of accounting changes. Overall, the literature provides virtually no evidence that
managers benefit from bonus compensation achieved through the effects of voluntary changes.
Voluntary changes associated with big baths and income smoothing also can be related to
managerial contracts. Indeed, Moore (1973) finds that the majority of companies with new
managers have income-decreasing voluntary changes that likely increase the probability of future
bonuses. Gordon (1964) argues that a smooth trend of earnings maximizes management’s
reputation and welfare, and he suggests that managers could use accounting policies to help
produce such a trend. The evidence in the literature indicates that managers smooth income with
voluntary changes, particularly those in manager as opposed to owner controlled companies
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(Smith 1976; Salamon and Smith 1979) as well as those facing bonus plans, political costs, and
unexpected earnings (Moses 1987). In addition, Elliott and Philbrick (1990) find evidence that is
consistent with managers making voluntary changes in order to smooth income.
Researchers who examine the role of debt contracts and financial distress on manager use
of voluntary changes hypothesize that managers are more likely to make income-increasing
voluntary changes when they are nearing default on covenants or have limited ability to receive
funding through credit markets. Most studies support this hypothesis, finding that managers are
more likely to make income-increasing voluntary changes when approaching debt covenant
default (Labelle 1990; Sweeney 1994) and experiencing financial distress (Schwartz 1982). In
addition, Beatty, Ramesh, and Webber (2002) find that companies with debt contracts that allow
voluntary changes in the calculation of covenants are willing to pay substantially higher interest
rates, suggesting that managers perceive value in the ability to potentially use voluntary changes
to improve covenant ratios. Beatty and Weber (2003) follow up to report that companies with
debt contracts that allow voluntary changes are more likely to make income-increasing changes.
Further support for the debt covenant hypothesis emerges from studies on specific types
of voluntary changes. Hunt (1985) provides evidence that companies are less likely to adopt
LIFO when financial ratios approach debt covenant limitations, likely due to the fact that LIFO
during the study’s time period decreases income and worsens financial ratios. Johnson and
Ramanan (1988) also find that oil and gas companies with higher or increasing levels of debt are
more likely to switch to full-cost accounting from successful efforts. In contrast to these studies,
Holthausen (1981) concludes that covenant constraints are not a determinant of voluntary
changes from accelerated depreciation methods to the straight-line method.

10

3.5

Strategic incentives – industry peers
It is possible that companies in the same industry make the same voluntary changes as

circumstances change or to compete with peers for resources. Pincus and Wasley (1994) is the
only study of which we are aware that examines the extent to which peers in the same industry
make similar types of voluntary changes in the same time periods. They do not find evidence of
clusters of voluntary changes in the same industry and year, except for LIFO adoptions in 1974.
3.6

Audit firm
Two descriptive studies provide evidence on the role of the auditor in making voluntary

changes. A study conducted with data prior to the surge of LIFO adoptions in the 1970s finds
that LIFO adoptions are more likely for clients of some firms, although there is no association
between specific auditors and the direction of income effects from the changes (Eggleton,
Penman, and Twombly 1976). Gosman (1973) provides descriptive evidence that clients of one
firm are less likely to report voluntary changes identified using consistency paragraphs in the
auditor’s report during the sample period of 1959-1968.
3.7

User reactions – stock market
Following the work of Ball and Brown (1968), researchers began examining whether the

market reacts to voluntary changes. This early literature generally finds that investors do not
react to voluntary changes, suggesting that the market is efficient (e.g., Ball 1972; Baskin 1972;
Kaplan and Roll 1972; Sunder 1973, 1975; Holthausen 1981). The focus of the literature then
shifts to investigating market responses to the adoption of LIFO. In contrast to earlier studies,
Abdel-Khalik and McKeown (1978), Brown (1980), Ricks (1982), and Hand (1993) find
evidence of a negative reaction to the announcement of LIFO adoption, consistent with the
market reacting to the lower earnings associated with LIFO. However, Biddle and Lindahl
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(1982) find a positive association between abnormal returns and the magnitude of tax savings
from LIFO adoption, and Stevenson (1987) also finds a positive market reaction to LIFO
switches using more accurate dates for the announcement of LIFO adoption than prior studies.
Other studies examine the market’s reaction to all types of voluntary changes. These
studies generally provide evidence of a negative market reaction that is contingent on other
factors. In particular, Harrison (1977) finds a negative market reaction to income-increasing
voluntary changes, and Dharan and Lev (1993) find negative abnormal returns only for
companies with income-increasing changes and only in the five years after the change. Likewise,
Cheng and Coulombe (1993) indicate abnormal returns are negative for companies that make
income-increasing voluntary changes but only when the companies face financial adversity that
was previously unknown to the market. Linck, Lopez, and Rees (2007) find no evidence of either
abnormal returns or differences in earnings informativeness following voluntary changes. In
general, prior research on the market’s response to voluntary changes yields mixed results, but
suggests that any market response to voluntary changes is likely contingent upon other factors.
3.8

User reactions – analysts
Prior literature suggests that analysts are prone to misestimating earnings for companies

with voluntary changes. Brown (1983) provides evidence that analysts inaccurately forecast
company earnings in the year following voluntary changes in pension costing assumptions.
Similarly, analysts overestimate company earnings in years with switches to LIFO (Biddle and
Ricks 1988). Analysts also have larger forecast errors and forecast dispersion in company years
with voluntary changes (Elliott and Philbrick 1990).
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4.

Insights from contemporary data
Although the published literature on voluntary changes primarily examines periods prior

to the late 1990s and early 2000s, the passage of time and associated environmental changes are
not necessarily sufficient to indicate that researchers should revisit fundamental questions
examined by prior research. In this section, we first discuss recent significant events that have
occurred since most prior studies were published. Then, we use voluntary changes reported after
the sample periods of most prior studies to provide descriptive evidence on whether the nature of
voluntary changes evolves over time.
4.1

Significant events since prior studies
At least two significant events have occurred since the time periods used in prior

literature. First, SOX introduced many reforms affecting the financial reporting environment,
which could increase the reporting of voluntary changes due to efforts to improve financial
reporting quality. However, increased regulatory scrutiny and greater penalties after SOX make
the opportunistic or inappropriate use of voluntary changes riskier for managers and auditors.
The post-SOX environment also has greater conservatism in financial reporting (Lobo and Zhou
2006, 2010), less earnings management (e.g., Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008), and less ability to hide
information (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian 2009), suggesting managers might be less likely to
report voluntary changes after SOX. As a result, the use of voluntary changes might increase,
decrease, or stay the same after SOX.
Second, the FASB issued SFAS No. 154 for fiscal years beginning after December 15,
2005. Although its proponents argued that it enhances financial statement consistency for the
periods presented and is more useful for making decisions (FASB 2005), practitioners
anticipated that the costs of retrospective application would outweigh the benefits, and they
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expected that users’ perceptions of financial statement credibility would suffer due to numerous
revisions of prior-period financial statements and improper conclusions that retrospective
application is the correction of errors (Deloitte 2004; EY 2004; Pfizer 2004).5 Accordingly, some
comment letter writers predicted that companies would make fewer voluntary changes in order to
avoid the financial statement user confusion and costs associated with applying the changes
(Deloitte 2004; EY 2004). Next, we consider both SOX and SFAS No. 154 as we present
descriptive evidence on voluntary changes to provide contemporary insight into their nature.
4.2

Sample selection and company industry
We identify voluntary changes through auditors’ preferability letters filed in 10-Qs and

10-Ks for fiscal year ends from June 1, 1995 through December 31, 2013.6,7 Table 2, Panel A
shows that we reduce our initial sample of 1,315 unique preferability letters by 248 and 61 due to
missing Compustat data and duplicates resulting from subsidiaries whose parent companies are
also in our sample, respectively, leading to a sample of 1,006 companies. We perform analyses
that require disclosure of the cumulative effect of the changes using 604 observations. Table 2,
Panel B presents the industry representation of the voluntary change companies in our sample.
[Insert Table 2 about Here]
We measure the cumulative effect upon implementation of voluntary changes as the
impact to net income or retained earnings. For pre-SFAS No. 154 changes, we use the prior
period amount presented on a separate line item on the income statement as our cumulative

5

SFAS No. 154 also requires retrospective application for mandatory accounting changes. Deloitte (2004) noted that
some companies applying retrospective treatment to all mandatory changes could have been required to revise their
prior period financial statements four separate times in 2003.
6
Regulation S-K Title 17 § 229.601 Paragraph b(18) requires filing preferability letters in Exhibit 18. Some
preferability letters disclose more than one voluntary change. We do not collect mandatory accounting changes or
voluntary changes in accounting estimates, as they are not disclosed via preferability letters.
7
We use directEDGAR (Kealey 2013) for our search of fiscal year ends from June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2011
and use Bloomberg BNA for our search of fiscal year ends from June 1, 2011 through December 31, 2013.
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effect (see $10 million increase in Exhibit 1, Panel C). For post-SFAS No. 154 changes, we use
the impact of the change on retained earnings as our cumulative effect (see $3,464 million
reduction in retained earnings in Exhibit 2, Panel C). Our approach allows us to consistently
measure the impact of voluntary changes across the two reporting regimes in our study.
4.3

Frequency and income effect of voluntary changes by time period
Table 3 compares by time period (pre-SOX, post-SOX, post-SFAS No. 154) the

frequency of voluntary changes, average number of changes per year, percentage of changes
disclosing an income effect and the direction of the effect, and percentage of changes with an
income effect that are above and below common materiality thresholds. We define pre-SOX as
1995 to 2001, post-SOX as 2002 to 2005, and post-SFAS No. 154 as 2006 to 2013. On average,
companies reported 52.9 voluntary changes per year. However, the average annual number of
voluntary changes increases from 51.3 in the pre-SOX period to 60.8 in the post-SOX period. It
then decreases to 50.5 in the post-SFAS No. 154 period, suggesting that manager reporting of
voluntary changes could be subject to external factors such as regulation and standards. We
return to these findings when we discuss future research opportunities (e.g., Sections 5.1 and
5.2). The percentage of voluntary changes disclosing income effect data decreases over time.8 In
the pre-SOX period, 79.1 percent of voluntary changes disclose an income effect, but the
percentage decreases to 65.8 in the post-SOX period and drops to 39.6 in the post-SFAS No. 154
period. These results suggest that managers perceive retrospective application as increasing the
costs associated with making voluntary changes with income effects after SFAS No. 154, which
is consistent with critics’ predictions. Sections 5.11 and 5.13 highlight how variation in the

8

Voluntary changes for which income effect data are not disclosed include those that: 1) do not have an income
effect, 2) have an income effect that is not disclosed (i.e., deemed too immaterial to disclose), or 3) are applied
prospectively (i.e., retrospective application after SFAS No. 154 is deemed “impracticable”).
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application of voluntary changes created by SFAS No. 154 can provide additional insight into
managers’ motivations and their effects on users.
[Insert Table 3 about Here]
Finally, Table 3 presents the quantitative materiality of the voluntary changes disclosing
an income effect. We use revenues as our materiality benchmark (Eilifsen and Messier 2015) and
report the percentage of voluntary changes that are less than 0.5 percent, between 0.5 and 1.0
percent, between 1.0 and 2.0 percent, and greater than 2.0 percent of sales. The percentage of
voluntary changes less than 0.5 percent of sales increases while the percentage of changes
greater than or equal to 2.0 percent of sales decreases from the pre-SOX period to the post-SOX
period but the percentages remain statistically the same between the post-SOX and post-SFAS
No. 154 periods. These results suggest that researchers could exploit this variation in quantitative
materiality to study determinants and effects across material and immaterial voluntary changes.
4.4

Voluntary change issue types and justifications
Table 4 presents the percentage of voluntary changes by issue type across the pre-SOX,

post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods. Appendix A provides definitions and examples of
issue types. Table 4 reveals that, overall, changes in the timing of goodwill impairment
evaluations are the most frequent type of change (17.7 percent) followed by changes for LIFO to
FIFO (16.7) and revenue recognition (7.7). Changes in the timing of goodwill impairment
evaluations and in financial statement classification are more prevalent in the post-SOX than the
pre-SOX period while changes in revenue recognition and pension recognition are less likely.9
Table 4 indicates that managers are more likely after SFAS No. 154 relative to the post-SOX
period to make voluntary changes related to goodwill impairment test timing, pension

9

In the interest of brevity, we discuss variation in the proportion of total voluntary changes for issue types
representing 50 or more total observations in the sample.

16

recognition, and financial statement classification. In contrast, managers were less likely after
SFAS No. 154 relative to the post-SOX period to make voluntary changes for LIFO to FIFO,
revenue recognition, and amortization/depreciation expense. The increases in goodwill
impairment test timing and classification changes in the post-SOX and post-SFAS No. 154
periods provide an explanation for the decrease in percentage of voluntary changes with income
effects in these same periods (Table 3). In summary, manager reporting of voluntary changes by
issue type is not consistent across time, suggesting some factors or circumstances could lead to
increases or decreases in specific types of voluntary changes. Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5
highlight opportunities for future research related to results identified in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about Here]
Table 5 presents 1,528 justifications that managers of our 1,006 sample companies
disclose for voluntary changes, an average of 1.54 justifications per company. Each reason
provided for voluntary changes falls into one of six categories: 1) more justifiable from an
accounting perspective because it better reflects economic reality or better follows principles
perceived as important such as matching or conservatism (40.0 percent of all reasons provided),
2) more advantageous administratively due to new systems or process improvements (15.6), 3)
more consistent with and more comparable to peer companies (14.9), 4) more consistent with
other company policies (13.6), 5) responsive to business or strategy changes (8.9), and 6)
justifiable for other reasons (7.0). Appendix B defines and provides examples for each category.
[Insert Table 5 about Here]
The descriptive evidence on justifications by time period indicates that the frequency of
accounting-related justifications has neither increased nor decreased across the periods. In
contrast, the use of administrative justifications increased after SOX and again after SFAS No.
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154. The increased use of administrative justifications coincides with the greater likelihoods of
making voluntary changes without an income effect as revealed in Tables 3 and 4. In addition,
justifications related to business or strategy changes are used less frequently after both SOX and
SFAS No. 154. Finally, companies are more likely after SOX than before SOX to justify changes
as conforming policies across the company and are less likely to justify changes as following
practices of peer companies. It appears from the justifications data that managers after SOX are
considering internal (i.e., administrative efficiencies, conforming disparate policies to the same
method) more than external (i.e., copying peer practices, responding to business changes)
benefits when making voluntary changes. In Sections 5.8, 5.9, and 5.11, we discuss opportunities
for future research using manager justifications.
Overall, the results indicate that there are differences in the use of voluntary changes over
time. This variation suggests that opportunities exist to extend prior literature on voluntary
changes. Further, new opportunities exist for future research on voluntary changes. In the next
section, we discuss potential areas for future research on voluntary changes.
5.

Opportunities for future research

5.1

Environment – regulation
Similar to our review of prior literature, we use the framework presented in Figure 1 to

organize our discussion of opportunities for future research on voluntary changes.10 Changes in
the regulatory landscape such as the introduction of SOX provide opportunities for researchers to
consider the impact of regulation on manager use of voluntary changes. After SOX, managers
have incentives to make voluntary changes in order to better reflect economic reality in the
financial statements or to implement procedural modifications related to financial reporting.

10

For parsimony, our discussion focuses on research opportunities using archival data, although we recognize that
many of our research opportunities can be examined with experimental or qualitative methods.
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However, reducing risk and reporting more conservatively after SOX could also decrease
manager use of voluntary changes if, as the prior literature finds prior to SOX, managers use
voluntary changes opportunistically for reasons related to poor financial performance and debt
contracting (Sections 3.2 and 3.4).11 As we discuss in Section 4.3, we observe an increase in the
average annual number of voluntary changes reported after SOX (Table 3). However, it is
unclear whether this finding would hold in a multivariate test, suggesting research is necessary to
determine the overall impact of SOX on the reporting of voluntary changes.
Although the overarching goal of SOX is to improve the financial reporting quality of
publicly-traded companies, some individual components of SOX likely have greater potential
than others to encourage or discourage manager reporting of voluntary changes.12 For illustration
purposes, we consider one of these components. The requirement for and value of auditor
attestation of internal control over financial reporting is arguably one of the most debated and
contested aspects of SOX. Accelerated filers and large accelerated filers are subject to SOX 404
(b) and must have an auditor attest to the effectiveness of their internal control over financial
reporting. In contrast, non-accelerated filers are not subject to SOX 404 (b) and are only required
by SOX 404 (a) to have managers attest to the effectiveness of internal controls. If the
requirement for auditor attestation of internal control encourages managers to improve both

11

Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB No. 99), Materiality (SEC 1999) identifies circumstances where items that
are quantitatively small could have a qualitatively material impact on financial statements. These circumstances
include masking a change in earnings or other trends, failing to meet analysts’ consensus forecasts, changing a loss
into income, compliance with loan covenants, and increasing management’s compensation. The benchmarks
itemized in SAB No. 99 provide researchers with examples to consider in determining whether managers
opportunistically use voluntary changes to achieve financial reporting outcomes. Throughout Section 5, unless
otherwise specified, we refer to voluntary changes that enable managers to achieve benchmarks such as those
referenced in SAB No. 99 as “opportunistic.”
12
A contemporaneous study considers the impact of a specific requirement of SOX regulation on manager use of
voluntary accounting changes. Keune and Keune (2017) suggest that managers make voluntary accounting changes
as part of their efforts to improve financial reporting processes and procedures following the identification of a
material weakness in internal control.
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financial reporting processes and quality beyond only the requirements of SOX 404 (a), we
expect companies subject to SOX 404 (b) make more voluntary changes than companies subject
only to SOX 404 (a).
In addition, variation in the nature of voluntary changes including their justifications and
their impact on income has the potential to provide insight into whether auditor attestation on
internal control encourages the improvement of financial reporting outcomes (e.g., accountingimprovement justifications) or financial reporting processes (e.g., administrative justifications).
Tables 4 and 5 reveal an increase in voluntary changes that do not impact net income (e.g.,
goodwill timing and pensions timing) and an increase in manager reporting of administrative
justifications after SOX (Section 4.4). However, it is unclear if these increases are more or less
prominent in companies subject to specific SOX mandates, as companies with auditor attestation
of internal control could be less likely to report voluntary changes if auditor attestation of
internal control curbs managers’ opportunistic use of voluntary changes. For these reasons, we
suggest the following research question as illustrative of questions that researchers can examine
on specific components of SOX:
RQ1: Are companies subject to the SOX mandate for auditor attestation on internal control
more likely or less likely to report voluntary changes than companies only subject to the
SOX mandate for manager reporting on internal control? If more likely, do the voluntary
changes impact financial reporting outcomes or financial reporting processes?
5.2

Environment – standards
New accounting standards also provide opportunities for research on voluntary

accounting changes. SFAS No. 154 is an accounting standard that critics suggested would create
a disincentive for managers to report voluntary changes, but this standard as it relates to
voluntary changes has not been considered in the literature (see Section 4.1). Accordingly, it
provides many opportunities for future research that can shed light on both voluntary changes
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and the effects of financial statement presentation on managers’ accounting choices. One of the
most apparent questions is whether SFAS No. 154 and its retrospective application requirement
is associated with a decrease in voluntary changes. The average number of voluntary changes per
year decreases from the post-SOX period to the post-SFAS No. 154 period (Section 4.3).
However, the number of changes per year after SFAS No. 154 is similar to that of the pre-SOX
period so it is unclear whether the standard (in a multivariate setting) has had an effect on
managers making voluntary changes (Section 4.3).
Another reporting change implemented in SFAS No. 154 provides a second question to
examine the impact of reporting requirements on managers’ decisions to implement accounting
changes. As discussed in Section 2, the impact of changes in depreciation, amortization, and
depletion method was historically reported as a cumulative effect adjustment, but is reported
prospectively after SFAS No. 154. In addition, an auditor preferability letter is no longer
required for these changes after SFAS No. 154. Accordingly, the costs for reporting changes in
depreciation, amortization, and depletion method are lower after SFAS No. 154. If reporting
costs are a primary determinant in manager decisions to make accounting changes as critics of
SFAS No. 154 contend, we expect to see no change or even an increase in depreciation,
amortization, and depletion method changes after SFAS No. 154.13 In line with the above
discussion, we propose the following research questions:
RQ2: Are managers less likely to report voluntary changes after SFAS No. 154’s requirement
for retrospective application of changes?
RQ3: Are managers more likely to report changes in depreciation, amortization, and depletion
method after SFAS No. 154 modified the reporting for these changes?

13

Consistent with the removal of the preferability letter requirement, amortization/depreciation expense voluntary
changes decline after SFAS No. 154 (Section 4.4). In addition to preferability letters, this research question also
requires the collection of data on changes in estimate that are effected by a change in accounting principle after
SFAS No. 154.
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Accounting standards other than SFAS No. 154 also have the potential to modify
manager reporting of voluntary changes if these standards modify the accounting discretion
available to managers. We focus our discussion on the accounting for revenue recognition but
acknowledge that additional research opportunities likely exist surrounding other accounting
standard changes. In 2014, the FASB issued Update No. 2014-09, Revenue from Contracts with
Customers (Topic 606), which public companies apply in fiscal years beginning after December
15, 2017. This update replaces SAB No. 104 and industry-specific explicit rules on revenue
recognition and provides principles-based guidance for public company revenue recognition,
likely increasing the discretion available to managers in accounting for revenue.14 Future
research can consider the extent to which this substantial shift in revenue accounting impacts
manager use of revenue-related discretion via voluntary changes, thereby informing future FASB
deliberations.15 We suggest the following research question based on the above discussion, as
illustrative of the nature of future research opportunities related to accounting standard setting:
RQ4: Are managers more likely to report voluntary changes for revenue after the effective date
of the principles-based guidance in Topic 606, Revenue from Contracts with Customers?
5.3

Environment – company and industry
In addition to the external influences of regulations and standards, internal influences

such as company characteristics and circumstances could also be important to managers’

14

Not all industries operate under specific and detailed revenue recognition standards and guidance. Companies in
industries without specific guidance follow general guidance issued by the FASB and Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
104 until the implementation of Topic 606. Therefore, it is possible that managers in some industries have less
discretion related to revenue recognition after the implementation of Topic 606.
15
In 1999 the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, which
was replaced by Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104 in 2003. These rules, along with developments in industryspecific guidance during this period, clarified the revenue recognition accounting for public companies, likely
reducing the discretion available to managers and the opportunities to make revenue-related voluntary changes.
Consistent with this expectation, we observe a decrease in revenue recognition changes after SOX in Table 4
(Section 4.4). Another potential research question related to standards is whether SAB No. 101 and SAB No. 104,
along with industry-specific guidance, reduced manager reporting of revenue-related voluntary changes.
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decisions regarding voluntary changes. Research in this area can provide insight into the reasons
for the changes, informing future accounting standard setting. We highlight two examples of
company characteristics and circumstances that have not been examined in prior literature and
could be determinants of voluntary changes.
First, companies that merge with or acquire other companies could be more likely to use
different accounting methods for the same transactions within the consolidated company. More
specifically, a newly acquired company could use a different inventory costing method than the
acquirer or could expense certain transactions that the acquirer capitalizes. As the companies
integrate their operations, managers could be more likely to make voluntary changes in order to
ensure policies are consistent within the combined entity, resulting in simplified accounting
processes and lower risk of future misstatements. The results in Table 5 reveal that managers
commonly justify voluntary changes by stating the new method conforms policies across the
company and that the use of this justification increased after the passage of SOX (Section 4.4).
Future research could further examine whether acquisitions are more likely to lead to voluntary
changes after SOX as the usefulness of conforming policies may have increased after SOX due
to the requirement for internal control assessments. This discussion leads to our next proposed
research question:
RQ5: Are managers more likely to make voluntary changes after mergers and acquisitions that
result in inconsistent methods within the company? Are voluntary changes after mergers
and acquisitions more likely in the post-SOX period? Is this effect present in companies
disclosing auditor and/or manager reports on internal control?
Another company characteristic that could encourage managers to make voluntary
changes is a company’s exposure to reporting requirements other than U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). When companies have subsidiaries in countries that require
IFRS, for example, managers could be more likely to switch to policies under U.S. GAAP that
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are more similar to IFRS. Aligning internal policies across IFRS and U.S. GAAP could reduce
the administrative burden of maintaining different accounting policies for similar transactions
and potentially improve the consistency of accounting methods within the company. For
instance, companies with operations in IFRS reporting countries could be more likely to
voluntarily change from LIFO to the FIFO method in the U.S. to align reporting for U.S.
locations with reporting for locations that have statutory reporting requirements in IFRS, which
does not allow the use of the LIFO method.16 Accordingly, we suggest the following question:
RQ6: Do companies that have a substantial presence in IFRS reporting countries make more
voluntary changes? If so, do these changes “converge” U.S. and IFRS accounting
methods within the company?
Similar to company characteristics, industry characteristics and circumstances could also
be associated with managers’ likelihood of making voluntary changes. An unexamined industry
characteristic and opportunity for future research is industry concentration or competition. When
industry concentration is high, companies could place greater importance on implementing
accounting policies that enhance their ability to compare favorably to industry competitors in
order to attract capital. A company, for example, that expenses certain costs might switch to
capitalizing and amortizing if operating results under immediate expensing appear less
favorable.17 The same reasoning could apply to other policies that have income effects such as
depreciation methods, inventory costing methods, and pension recognition policies, suggesting
the following research question:
RQ7: Are companies in highly concentrated or more competitive industries more likely to make
voluntary changes?

16

This expectation could be one factor contributing to the substantial percentage of voluntary changes (16.7 percent)
from LIFO to FIFO during our sample period (see Table 4).
17
This argument could also apply to peer companies. That is, industry peers in highly concentrated or competitive
industries may be more likely to make voluntary changes after one company in the industry makes a similar change.
To avoid redundancy, we do not propose a similar research question in our Section 5.7 discussion of industry peers.
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5.4

Environment – economy
In addition to factors associated with individual companies and their specific industries,

macro-level economic factors could impact a company’s circumstances and managers’
subsequent decision to report a voluntary change. A wide range of opportunities is available for
future research in this area. We offer as examples two possible links between economic factors
and the likelihood that a company reports a voluntary change. First, our sample period of 19952013 includes an economic downturn in the early 2000s and the financial crisis in 2008.
Unfavorable economic climates present a change in circumstances that could necessitate a
change in policies. For instance, in periods of economic decline, goodwill impairments could be
more likely or more significant, and goodwill impairment evaluations in these circumstances
likely require more time to complete to determine if a writedown is necessary. As a result,
companies could make a voluntary change to move the timing of goodwill impairment
evaluations earlier in the year to ensure adequate time to complete analyses and evaluations prior
to year-end. (See Section 4.4 for a discussion of changes in the frequency of timing of goodwill
evaluations in our sample.) Alternatively, financial performance often suffers during economic
downturns, and managers could be more likely to make income-increasing voluntary changes or
voluntary changes that improve the appearance of financial statement trends to help offset the
effects of the downturn on the financial statements. Therefore, we propose the following research
question:
RQ8: Are managers more likely to report voluntary changes during a financial crisis or
economic downturn? If so, is this increase due to opportunism or improving financial
reporting quality and processes?
A second example of a research opportunity related to economic changes extends prior
work on the LIFO inventory method. As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, the literature has
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extensively examined the factors leading to widespread LIFO adoptions in 1974 and 1975.
However, to our knowledge, no studies have examined why companies move away from LIFO.
The prior literature attributes LIFO adoptions to inflation as well as tax savings, but it is unclear
when and why companies elect to change away from LIFO, especially since the changes occur
over time rather than all at once. As we noted in Section 4.4, changes from LIFO to FIFO are one
of the most common issue types in our sample (Table 4). It is possible that consistently low
inflation or increases in productivity and efficiency cause the LIFO method to be less
representationally faithful. Similar to Dopuch and Pincus (1988) who find that LIFO adoptions
occur once the tax benefits become sufficiently large, research into changes away from LIFO
could investigate whether a particular economic factor leads to a tipping point at which managers
change to a different method. The literature made significant progress on our understanding of
inventory costing decisions after the economic conditions of the 1970s, but there is much that we
still do not understand about factors that lead to inventory method changes after previously
studied conditions subside. This leads to our next proposed research question:
RQ9: Are managers more likely to move away from the LIFO inventory method in times of
low or decreasing inflation or in times of high or increasing productivity/efficiency?
5.5

Strategic incentives – managerial contracts, debt contracts, and financial distress
Although the impact of bonus plans, debt covenants, and financial distress on voluntary

changes was a focus of prior research (see Section 3.4), there are reasons to revisit these areas.
We provide examples of two such reasons. First, a reexamination of the bonus plan hypothesis is
warranted due to the contemporary availability of a variety of executive compensation data.
More detailed executive compensation disclosure data became available in proxy statements
beginning in 1992 and was further enhanced in 2006 to include disclosure of specific targets and
performance measures. It is possible that, while voluntary changes are not related to the existence
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of a bonus plan overall (e.g., Hunt 1985), changes could be associated with closeness to specific
bonus targets available in more recent proxy statements. Researchers could reexamine the impact
of bonus plans on voluntary changes using these more detailed disclosure data.
Second, SFAS No. 154 significantly modified the reporting for voluntary changes (see
Section 2). Accordingly, it significantly modified the ways that managers can use voluntary
changes to opportunistically achieve financial reporting outcomes due to the requirement for
retrospective treatment. For this reason, SFAS No. 154 provides motivation to examine whether
managers continue to use voluntary changes to meet debt covenant calculations.
Many entirely new research questions are also possible using contemporary data and
conditions. For brevity, we focus on only one potential avenue. Retrospective treatment required
by SFAS No. 154 does not preclude managers from using voluntary changes opportunistically to
achieve certain outcomes. Instead, retrospective treatment likely modifies how managers use
voluntary changes opportunistically. For example, managers could be more likely after SFAS
No. 154 to use voluntary changes to execute an opportunistic strategy to shift earnings decreases
to prior years, resulting in the appearance of lower income in prior years, higher income in future
years, and an improved overall trend across years. For example, Table 4 reveals an increase in
pension recognition changes after SFAS No. 154 that often decrease prior-year income through
retrospective application, likely resulting in increased income in current or future periods
(Section 4.4). Future research could examine whether managers use the retrospective application
of voluntary changes to shift losses into prior periods as part of a strategy to improve earnings
trends, leading to the following research question:
RQ10: After SFAS No. 154, are managers more likely to make voluntary changes that shift
losses rather than gains to prior periods? If so, does this strategy improve the appearance
of the trend in earnings?
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5.6

Strategic incentives – company and managerial reputation
Companies and managers experience reputation damaging events such as financial

reporting fraud that call into question the quality of their financial reporting practices. It is
important for managers to quickly reassure financial statement users and other external parties
that the company is committed to high-quality financial reporting because damaging events
could be associated with lower stock prices, higher costs of capital, manager turnover, and
penalties from regulators (Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004;
Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006). Managers could potentially use the public disclosure and
corresponding auditor approval of voluntary changes to signal managerial diligence to investors,
regulators, and the external labor market after a negative event, such as financial reporting fraud.
Based on this discussion, we propose the following example of a research question in this area:
RQ11: Do managers make voluntary changes after a reputation damaging event such as financial
reporting fraud? If so, does the reporting of voluntary changes improve the market’s
response and/or regulators’ response in these circumstances?
5.7

Strategic incentives – industry peers
Although Pincus and Wasley (1994) do not find evidence of companies in the same

industry making voluntary changes in the same year (Section 3.5), our justification results in
Table 5 suggest that managers do consider peer practices when determining their own accounting
policies. We also observed during data collection that the same voluntary changes were made by
multiple companies but over a longer period of time than one year. For instance, several cruise
and cargo ship companies made income-increasing voluntary changes related to drydock costs
over many years (e.g., Europa Cruises Corporation in 1995, Seaboard Corporation in 2003, and
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. in 2005). The data and anecdotal evidence raise questions on
whether and why companies change accounting methods after peer companies also make similar
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changes. Future research could examine whether companies make voluntary changes after peers
for comparability purposes or for opportunistic reasons. This discussion leads to the following
research question:
RQ12: Do managers make voluntary changes in response to voluntary changes made by their
industry peers? Is this to improve financial reporting or for opportunistic reasons?
5.8

Manager characteristics
Although managers are central to the voluntary change process, the only prior study of

which we are aware that examines a manager characteristic is Moore (1973), who finds that
companies with new managers are more likely to make income-decreasing voluntary changes
than companies without management changes. For that reason, many opportunities exist related
to the impact of manager characteristics on voluntary changes. For example, researchers could
examine whether greater financial accounting expertise is associated with managers who make
voluntary changes, as the identification and justification of more preferable accounting methods
(for opportunistic reasons or to improve financial reporting) requires relatively advanced
accounting knowledge.18 Further, researchers could also examine whether these manager
characteristics lead to any differences in the reporting of opportunistic voluntary changes and
changes to improve financial reporting. We propose the following research question as an
example of the many questions that are possible:
RQ13: Are managers with greater financial accounting expertise more or less likely to make
voluntary changes? If so, are they more likely to make changes to improve financial
reporting or for opportunistic reasons? Are they more likely to disclose justifications that
reflect whether they make changes to improve financial reporting or for opportunistic
reasons?

18

Relevant indicators of accounting expertise include certifications, a degree in accounting versus finance, the
number of years of accounting experience, the number of years of specific industry experience, and prior manager or
partner experience in public accounting.
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5.9

Corporate governance
The majority of research on voluntary changes occurred prior to the SOX-mandated

enhancement of the audit committee’s role, suggesting many new research opportunities exist
regarding how the audit committee impacts the use of voluntary changes. In its governance
capacity, the audit committee could moderate managers’ role in the use of voluntary changes
(i.e., an interaction between manager and audit committee characteristics). For example,
independent audit committee members, members with longer tenure, and members with more
expertise could provide greater oversight of financial reporting and be more likely to reject
voluntary changes that are opportunistic or do not improve financial reporting and could be more
likely to accept voluntary changes that improve financial reporting. However, it is also possible
that the audit committee drives (i.e., a main effect) the use of voluntary changes by initiating or
suggesting changes to managers.19 Audit committee members often have officer positions and
directorships at other companies. These “network” companies could use accounting methods
other than the methods used by the company, potentially resulting in an audit committee member
suggesting a more preferable accounting method for the company. Alternatively, “network”
companies could initiate voluntary changes, leading an audit committee member to suggest a
similar change at the company. As an illustration of the opportunities available related to audit
committees and voluntary changes, we propose the following research question:
RQ14: Do novel policies and/or voluntary changes at network companies lead audit committee
members to initiate voluntary changes? Is this to improve financial reporting or for
opportunistic reasons? How do these companies justify their changes?

19

For simplicity, we depict the audit committee’s and audit firm’s potential effects as moderators in Figure 1.
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5.10

Audit firm
Although the auditor must evaluate voluntary changes (see Section 2), prior literature

provides only univariate evidence indicating the auditor could impact managers’ use of this form
of discretion (see Section 3.6). Accordingly, many opportunities for future research are available
regarding the auditor’s role in managers’ voluntary change decisions, although we provide only
one specific avenue for future research in this area. It is possible that auditor expertise moderates
managers’ use of voluntary changes as auditors with greater expertise may curtail opportunistic
reporting of voluntary changes or encourage managers’ reporting of changes that improve
financial reporting (i.e., an interaction).20 Although auditors are only responsible for the
evaluation of these changes, it is also possible that auditors with expertise could identify and
initiate opportunities for managers to report voluntary changes (i.e., a main effect). Based on this
discussion, we provide the following example of a research question:
RQ15: Does auditor expertise curtail or encourage manager reporting of voluntary changes? Is
this to improve financial reporting or for opportunistic reasons? What are the
characteristics of the companies and their managers in these circumstances?
5.11

Financial reporting choices
Prior researchers have examined some of the additional data points disclosed with

voluntary changes, such as the issue type and direction of income effect (e.g., Kaplan and Roll
1972; Sweeney 1994; Beatty and Weber 2003). We suggest that researchers incorporate these
data points into research questions on the various topics in Figure 1 to provide further evidence
on how managers use voluntary changes. For example, in addition to examining the likelihood of
making voluntary changes, researchers can also examine managers’ propensity to make changes
that exceed common materiality thresholds (e.g., one percent of sales), their propensity to make

20

For example, auditors can have industry expertise or personal experience with voluntary changes at other clients.
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changes with no income effect versus those with an income effect, or their propensity to exceed
(or fall short of) GAAP’s requirements for the information provided in voluntary change
disclosures.
Voluntary change disclosure data points such as manager justifications (see Table 5) can
also serve as the primary focus of a study. Managers justify many voluntary changes using
accounting reasons that claim the new policy is more reflective of economic reality or more
transparent. Reasons such as these imply there are benefits from these voluntary changes.
Researchers could examine earnings response coefficients and indicators of earnings quality
before and after voluntary changes with accounting justifications to determine whether there are
indeed benefits associated with these changes. Examining this research question before and after
SFAS No. 154 could also be informative because retrospective treatment for voluntary changes
modifies how managers can make opportunistic changes (see Section 5.2 for further discussion),
suggesting there could be a change in the effect of voluntary changes justified with accounting
reasons after SFAS No. 154. This leads to the following research question example:
RQ16: Are voluntary changes disclosed with accounting-improvement related justifications
associated with changes in earnings response coefficients and earnings quality? If so, are
the effects different after SFAS No. 154?
5.12

User reactions – stock market
Some prior studies examining market reactions to voluntary changes find evidence of

negative abnormal stock returns after companies make income-increasing changes (e.g., Harrison
1977; Dharan and Lev 1993; Cheng and Coulombe 1993). However, all of the studies of which
we are aware investigate market reactions to voluntary changes occurring prior to SOX. We
contend that the passage of SOX and the implementation of SFAS No. 154 warrant a
reexamination of this literature (see Section 4.1 for a discussion). Market reactions to voluntary

32

changes made after SOX and/or SFAS No. 154 are important empirical questions because the
research would provide insight not only into investors’ perceptions of voluntary changes, but
also more broadly into the effects of major legislation and changes in accounting presentation.
We illustrate one potential question based on SFAS No. 154’s requirement for
retrospective treatment. Prior to SFAS No. 154, regulators and academics were concerned that
investors could be alarmed by the increase in restatements following SOX, leading to the
potential for confusion about the quality of financial reports (Burks 2011). Similarly, many
practitioners were concerned that the retrospective application of voluntary changes, despite
being labeled as retrospective application, would lead investors to confuse voluntary changes
with restatements, resulting in a negative view of voluntary changes (e.g., Pfizer 2004).
However, it is unclear whether investors are indeed confused by the retrospective presentation of
voluntary changes. Therefore, we propose the following research question:
RQ17: Does the market respond differently to voluntary changes after SFAS No. 154?
5.13

User reactions – analysts
As we discuss in Section 3.8, the prior literature generally finds that analysts experience

challenges in forecasting earnings in the same year as and year following company reporting of
voluntary changes. However, the implementation of SFAS No. 154 is a significant change since
the time period of the previous studies. This change in accounting treatment could facilitate
various research questions, and we highlight one example. Retrospective treatment for voluntary
changes presents prior period financial statements under the new method and, accordingly, limits
the amount of the change that affects current year earnings. In contrast, prior to SFAS No. 154
the entire cumulative income effect of the voluntary change impacted current year earnings, and
prior period financial statements were not revised. If prior period financial statements are
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presented using the new method, then the collection of analysts’ forecasts for a company after
the reporting of the voluntary change likely exhibits less dispersion as any adjustments to
forecasts for the voluntary change are less complex. This leads to the following research
question:
RQ18: After SFAS No. 154, are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate and less dispersed
for company years after voluntary changes?
6.

Conclusion
Voluntary changes in accounting principle represent explicit choices by managers to

exercise accounting discretion. This paper develops an organizing framework to review prior
literature on voluntary changes, provides descriptive insights on contemporary changes, and
identifies opportunities for future research on voluntary changes. The voluntary change literature
is robust and has examined many questions using data prior to SOX. Contemporary voluntary
changes often vary across the pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods by the
materiality of their income effect, their issue type, and justifications provided by managers,
suggesting that manager use of voluntary changes has evolved over time. We consider future
research opportunities on potential determinants of voluntary changes (i.e., strategic incentives,
environmental conditions, and manager characteristics). We also consider the potential direct or
moderating role of corporate governance and auditors on manager use of voluntary changes.
Finally, we consider user reactions to voluntary changes. Our study is useful to researchers and
standards setters who require knowledge of this fundamental decision to exercise accounting
discretion, desire an understanding of contemporary voluntary change data, or plan to study
accounting choice through voluntary changes.
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APPENDIX A
Definitions and Examples of Voluntary Change Issue Types
Amort./Depreciation Expense
Definition: Amortization, depreciation, and depletion expense method (e.g., change from straight-line to units of
production) including interest expense, fixed assets, mining assets, deferred costs, etc.
Example:
…we changed our method of computing depreciation on domestic fixed assets from the double
declining method to the straight-line method. – Cyberonics (1999)
Assets – Capitalize to Expense
Definition: Expense recognition change from capitalizing an asset to expensing as incurred or accruing a liability.
Example:
…we changed our accounting policy for rail grinding costs from a capitalization method, under which
we capitalized the cost of rail grinding and depreciated such capitalized costs, to a direct expense
method, under which we expense rail grinding costs as incurred. – Union Pacific Corporation (2010)
Assets – Expense to Capitalize
Definition: Expense recognition change from expensing as incurred or accruing a liability to capitalizing an asset.
Example:
Instruments are hand held devices used by orthopaedic surgeons…instruments are recognized as longlived assets and are included in property, plant and equipment. Undeployed instruments are carried at
cost, net of allowances for obsolescence. Instruments in the field are carried at cost less accumulated
depreciation… In prior periods, undeployed instruments were carried as a prepaid expense at cost and
recognized in selling, general and administrative expense in the year in which the instruments were
placed into service. – Zimmer (2003)
Assets – Other Recognition
Definition: Asset recognition including cash, property, plant, and equipment, equity method investments,
goodwill, and intangibles.
Example:
The Company has reclassified its rotating service spare parts assets from inventory to non-current
assets in the accompanying Balance Sheets… – Integrated Measurement Systems (1996)
Classification
Definition: Classification and net or gross presentation of assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, and expenses. These
changes have no effect on current period net income, prior period net income, or retained earnings.
Example:
…the Company changed its definition of cash equivalents for presentation in the statement of cash
flows. The Company previously defined short-term investments with original maturities of 90 days or
less to be cash equivalents for statement of cash flow purposes. The Company changed its policy to
exclude short-term investments from cash equivalents. – Selective Insurance Group (2006)
Complex Issues
Definition: Complex accounting issues including derivatives, business combinations, deferred taxes, leases, sharebased awards, and asset retirement obligations.
Example:
… the Company elected to designate the changes in forward exchange rates for the measurement of
effectiveness in net investment hedges… the Company has decided to designate the changes in spot
exchange rates for the measurement of effectiveness in net investment hedges. – Oracle (2001)
Consolidation – Timing
Definition: Consolidation timing including foreign subsidiaries.
Example:
Historically, the Company consolidated its international subsidiaries using the twelve month period
ended December 31st...Due to more efficient financial reporting procedures, the Company was able to
eliminate this one month lag in fiscal 2004. - Hayes Lemmerz International, Inc. (2005)
Estimation and Valuation
Definition: Estimation method changes including workers’ compensation liability, warranty accrual, recoverability
of goodwill, fair values of goodwill, and insurance reserves and not including amortization and
depreciation expense.
Example:
…CONSOL Energy changed its method of accounting for workers’ compensation. Under the new
method, the undiscounted liability is actuarially calculated based on claims filed and an estimate of
claims incurred but not yet reported. Additionally, the workers’ compensation liability will be recorded
on a discounted basis, which has been actuarially determined using various assumptions, including a
discount rate of 6% and a future health care trend rate of 10%, declining to 4.75% in 2010. – CONSOL
Energy (2004)
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APPENDIX A - Continued
Goodwill – Timing
Definition: Assessment timing for goodwill.
Example:
…the date of the annual goodwill impairment test for Field Services was changed to August 31st from
September 30th. - Duke Energy Corporation (2004)
Inventory – FIFO to LIFO
Definition: Inventories change from first in, first out to last in, first out.
Example:
…the Company changed its method of accounting for certain inventories of the Pork Division from
FIFO to LIFO… – Seaboard Corporation (1999)
Inventory – LIFO to FIFO
Definition: Inventories change from last in, first out to first in, first out.
Example:
…one subsidiary used the LIFO (last-in, first-out) method to determine cost...the subsidiary changed to
the FIFO method. – NS Group, Inc. (1998)
Inventory – Other Method
Definition: Other inventory costing changes (e.g., weighted average to last in, first out).
Example:
…we changed our method of valuing our U.S. inventories to the average cost method. In prior years,
principally all U.S. inventories were valued using the last-in, first-out (“LIFO”) method. – Kraft
Foods, Inc. (2009)
Inventory – Other Recognition
Definition: Other inventory recognition issues including changes in calculation, recognition periods,
overhead/administrative cost allocation, inventory pools, and price indices.
Example:
The Company assigns cost to store inventories using the retail inventory method…the Company used
one inventory pool for this calculation…the Company began using approximately thirty inventory
pools in its retail inventory calculation. – Dollar Tree, Inc. (2010)
Liabilities
Definition: Liability recognition including changes in accrual method and related timing of expense recognition.
Example:
…PECO changed its method of accounting for nuclear outage costs to record such costs as incurred.
Previously, PECO accrued these costs over the operating cycle. – Exelon Corporation (2000)
Other
Definition: Other issues including equity, overall financial statement presentation, and issues with unclear
disclosures. Also includes companies with multiple voluntary changes in the same year.
Example:
…the Company changed the presentation of its cash flows from the direct method to the indirect
method… – Encore Capital Group, Inc. (2008)
Pensions – Recognition
Definition: Pensions recognition including calculations, amortization, and valuation.
Example:
Historically, Verizon has recognized actuarial gains and losses as a component of Equity in its
consolidated balance sheets on an annual basis. These gains and losses were amortized into operating
results generally over the average future service period of active employees. Verizon elected to
immediately recognize actuarial gains and losses in its operating results in the year in which the gains
and losses occur. – Verizon Communications, Inc. (2010)
Pensions – Timing
Definition: Assessment timing for pensions.
Example:
…we changed the annual measurement date of our pension plan assets used in determining their
market-related value and of our plan liabilities for our pension plans and postretirement benefit plans
from September 30 to November 30. – Cummins, Inc. (2002)
Revenue
Definition: Revenue recognition issues such as contract accounting and timing of recognition.
Example:
…the Company made a preferential change in its revenue recognition policies regarding semesterbased tuition for its campus-based universities…The universities now recognize tuition revenue ratably
on a weekly straight-line basis over each academic session instead of the previously used monthly
straight-line basis. – Laureate Education, Inc. (2006)
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APPENDIX B
Definitions and Examples of Justification Types
Accounting Terms
Definition: Accounting justification such as better matching, more transparent, more conservative, more reflective
of economic substance due to factors including better measurement, better precision, better information
for decisions, and less subjectivity.
Examples: The Company believes that the straight-line method … provides a better matching of revenues and
expenses. – TranSwitch Corporation (2003)
The change in accounting method was made because the Company believes that it better reflects the
substance of the Company’s collaborative agreements–… - Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2003)
Administrative
Definition: Administrative justification such as utilizing new administrative availability or systems, improving
timeliness of reporting, facilitating budgeting or planning processes, and improving benefits over costs.
Example:
…the Company changed its annual impairment testing date…The Company believes the last day of the
eleventh month of the fiscal year is preferable as it provides the Company additional time to complete
the impairment test and report the results of that test in the Company’s annual filing on Form 10-–. LeCroy Corporation (2008)
Conforming Policies Within Company (Conforming Policies)
Definition: Conforming policies across subsidiaries, often due to a recent merger.
Example:
…the Company changed its method of valuing inventories in the United States from the lower of lastin, first-out (LIFO) cost or market to the lower of first-in, first-out (FIFO) cost or market in order to
provide conformity among subsidiaries due to recent acquisition–. - Carson, Inc. (1997)
Conforming Policies with Policies of Peers (Peers)
Definition: Using accounting principles consistent with industry peers.
Example:
…the new accounting principle is preferable because the direct expense method is the predominant
method used in the airline industry… - World Airways, Inc. (2000)
In Response to Business or Economic Change (Response to Change)
Definition: Responding to company changes including changes in fiscal year end and business strategy.
Example:
The adoption of this method…reflects the change in the operating strategy of the Company as a result
of the BFI acquisition. Previously the Comp’ny's strategy was focused on the acquisition and
development of waste disposal capacity. Through the BFI acquisition, the Company substantially
achieved its previous strategy and will now focus on the increased utilization of landfill capacit–. Allied Waste Industries, Inc. (1999)
Other
Definition: Other or no justification.
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EXHIBIT 1
Illustration of Pre-SFAS No. 154 Voluntary Change Disclosures
Panel A: Preferability Letter from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – PPL Corporation
… Note 14 to the financial statements describes a change in accounting principle related to the method of
amortization of unrecognized gains and losses in the annual pension expense/income… It should be
understood that the preferability of one acceptable method of accounting over another for the amortization
of unrecognized gains or losses calculated in the annual pension expense/income determined under SFAS
87 has not been addressed in any authoritative accounting literature, and in expressing our concurrence
below we have relied on management's determination that this change in accounting principle is
preferable. Based on our reading of management's stated reasons and justification for this change in
accounting principle in the Form 10-K, and our discussions with management as to their judgment about
the relevant business planning factors relating to the change, we concur with management that such
change represents, in the Company's circumstances, the adoption of a preferable accounting principle in
conformity with Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20.
Panel B: Auditor’s Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – PPL Corporation
…PPL also changed its method of accounting for amortizing unrecognized gains or losses in the annual
pension expense/income determined under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87,
Employers' Accounting for Pensions, as discussed in Note 14 to the consolidated financial statements.
Panel C: Consolidated Income Statement Excerpt – PPL Corporation (in millions, except per share)
2001
2000
1999
Income Before Cumulative Effect of a Change in Accounting Principle
Cumulative Effect of a Change in Accounting Principle (net of
income taxes) (Note 14)

221

Income Before Dividends on Preferred Securities
Dividends - Preferred Securities

231
52

Net Income

524

458

524
26

458
26

10

$ 179 $ 498 $ 432

Panel D: Note 14 Excerpt – PPL Corporation (in millions, except per share)
In 2001 PPL changed its method of amortizing unrecognized gains or losses in the annual pension
expense/income determined under SFAS 87, "Employers' Accounting for Pensions." This change resulted
in a cumulative-effect credit of $10 million after-tax or $.07 per basic share, which is reflected as a
"Cumulative Effect of a Change in Accounting Principle" on the Statement of Income. Under the old
method, unrecognized gains and losses in excess of ten percent of the greater of the plan's projected
benefit obligation or market-related value of plan assets were amortized on a straight-line basis over the
estimated average future service period of plan participants. Under the new method, a second corridor
will be utilized for unrecognized gains and losses in excess of thirty percent of the plan's projected benefit
obligation. Unrecognized gains and losses outside the second corridor will be amortized on a straight-line
method over a period equal to one-half of the average future service period of the plan participants. The
new method is preferable under SFAS 87 because it provides more current recognition of gains and
losses, thereby lessening the accumulation of unrecognized gains and losses.
Notes: PPL Corporation reported a voluntary change in accounting principle in its December 31, 2001 10K. The above are excerpts from the related disclosures.
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EXHIBIT 2
Illustration of Post-SFAS No. 154 Voluntary Change Disclosures
Panel A: Preferability Letter from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – Honeywell International, Inc.
…As discussed further in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company changed its
method of accounting for pension costs… It should be understood that the preferability of one acceptable
method of accounting over another for pension costs has not been addressed in any authoritative
accounting literature, and in expressing our concurrence below we have relied on management’s
determination that this change in accounting principle is preferable. Based on our reading of
management’s stated reasons and justification for this change in accounting principle in the Form 10-K,
and our discussions with management as to their judgment about the relevant business planning factors
relating to the change, we concur with management that such change represents, in the Company’s
circumstances, the adoption of a preferable accounting principle in conformity with Accounting Standards
Codification 250, Accounting Changes and Error Corrections.
Panel B: Auditor’s Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers Excerpt – Honeywell International, Inc.
As discussed in Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements, in 2010 the Company has changed its
method of accounting for defined benefit pension costs. All periods have been retroactively restated for
this accounting change.
Panel C: Note 1 Excerpt – Honeywell International, Inc.
In 2010 we elected to change our method of recognizing pension expense. Previously, for our U.S.
defined benefit pension plans we used the market-related value of plan assets reflecting changes in the fair
value of plan assets over a three-year period and net actuarial gains or losses in excess of 10 percent of the
greater of the market-related value of plan assets or the plans’ projected benefit obligation (the corridor)
were recognized over a six-year period. Under our new accounting method, we recognize changes in the
fair value of plan assets and net actuarial gains or losses in excess of the corridor annually in the fourth
quarter each year (MTM Adjustment). The remaining components of pension expense, primarily service
and interest costs and assumed return on plan assets, will be recorded on a quarterly basis (On-going
Pension Expense). While the historical policy of recognizing pension expense was considered acceptable,
we believe that the new policy is preferable as it eliminates the delay in recognition of actuarial gains and
losses outside the corridor. This change has been reported through retrospective application of the new
policy to all periods presented. The impacts of all adjustments made to the financial statements are
summarized below:
Consolidated Statement of Operations

Cost of products sold
Cost of services sold
Selling, general and administrative expenses
Income before taxes
Tax expense
Net income
Net income attributable to Honeywell
Earnings per share of common stock-basic
Earnings per share of common stock-assuming dilution
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Year Ended December 31, 2009
Previously
Effect of
Reported
Revised
Change
18,637
19,317
680
4,548
4,695
147
4,341
4,443
102
2,978
2,049
(929)
789
465
(324)
2,189
1,584
(605)
2,153
1,548
(605)
2.86
2.06
(0.80)
2.85
2.05
(0.80)

EXHIBIT 2 - Continued
Balance Sheet

December 31, 2009
Effect
Previously
of
Reported Revised Change
2,017
2,006
(11)
36,004 35,993
(11)
6,481
6,453
(28)
(4,429)
(948) 3,481
17,487 14,023 (3,464)
8,844
8,861
17
8,954
8,971
17
36,004 35,993
(11)

Deferred income taxes
Total assets
Other liabilities
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)
Retained earnings
Total Honeywell shareowners’ equity
Total shareowners’ equity
Total liabilities and shareowners’ equity

Notes: Honeywell International, Inc. reported a voluntary change in accounting principle in its December
31, 2010 10-K. The above are excerpts from the related disclosures. Additional disclosures on the annual
impact of the voluntary change on prior years are available in the Honeywell 10-K.
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FIGURE 1
Framework of Prior Research and Opportunities for Future Research
on Voluntary Changes

Determinants and/or Moderators

Environment

Strategic Incentives

• Tax/Other Regulation

• Managerial Contracts,
Debt Contracts, and
Financial Distress

• Standards
• Company and Industry

• Company and
Managerial Reputation

• Economy
• Industry Peers

Manager

Corporate
Governance

Audit Firm

Effects/Consequences

Voluntary Changes/
Other Financial Reporting
Choices

User Reactions
• Stock Market
• Analysts

Note: Figure 1 presents an organizing framework for discussion of prior research and opportunities for future
research on voluntary changes. Boxes with thick borders and categories in bold font indicate topics that are not
examined in prior research, but are opportunities for future research. For parsimony, Figure 1 illustrates
environmental determinants, strategic incentives, and managerial characteristics as determinants of voluntary
changes and corporate governance and audit firm as moderators of voluntary changes. However, these
“determinants” could serve as moderators, and “moderators” could serve as determinants.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF PRIOR LITERATURE ON VOLUNTARY CHANGES
Panel A: Literature on Tax Regulation (Section 3.1)
Author
(Date)a
Morse and
Richardson
(1983)

Focus of Study
Examines potential
tax benefits in the
years surrounding a
change in inventory
costing methods

Sample
• 48 companies from
1939-1978 in six
industries with a
wholesale price index

Main Variables
IV:
• Tax benefits of switching to
LIFO
DV:
• Voluntary changes to LIFO

Dopuch and
Pincus (1988)

Examines why
companies change
from FIFO to LIFO

• 70 companies that
switched from FIFO to
LIFO from 1965-1978
• 102 FIFO companies
from 1962-1981
• 29 LIFO companies
from 1962-1981

Bartley and
Chen
(1992)****

Examines whether
the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA)
caused discretionary
accounting changes
Provides descriptive
evidence on
voluntary changes
and the economic
characteristics of
companies making
changes

• 1,863 companies from
July 1986-June 1988

IVs:
• Tax savings
• Size (Assets and Sales)
• Market value of equity
• Net income
DV:
• Inventory and cost of sales
using other costing method
IV:
• TRA time periods
DVs:
• Income-increasing/decreasing
discretionary changes
IVs:
• Sales
• Earnings growth
• Leverage
• Dividend constraints
• Industry and year
DV:
• Voluntary changes

Pincus and
Wasley
(1994)***

• 2,249 companies that
made voluntary changes
from 1969-1988 (2,978
company years)
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Key Findings
• Companies with different inventory methods than
industry peers have different tax benefit
characteristics.
• LIFO-switch tax benefits are higher in change year.
• Companies wait until tax savings hit a certain level
before making LIFO change.
• Large companies are more likely to adopt LIFO.
• Changes to LIFO appear related to tax savings.
• High inflation rates were likely responsible for LIFO
adoptions in 1974 due to large immediate tax savings.
• When the difference between LIFO and FIFO cost of
sales becomes large, companies switch to LIFO.
• Companies that use FIFO long-term do not forego
large tax savings by remaining on FIFO.
• Companies make accounting changes that maintain
book-tax conformity.
• Very few companies make accounting changes to
reduce their exposure to the alternative minimum tax.
• The most common voluntary changes are LIFO
adoptions, which are associated with inflation.
• Non-LIFO voluntary changes are typically incomeincreasing.
• Companies making income-increasing voluntary
changes have lower sales, lower earnings growth,
higher leverage, and tighter dividend constraints.
• Non-LIFO changes do not cluster by industry/time.
• Earnings response coefficients negatively correlated
with non-LIFO changes.

Author
(Date)a
Pincus and
Wasley
(1996)

Keating and
Zimmerman
(2000)****

Focus of Study
Examines stock
returns surrounding
LIFO changes
announced prior to
or at the same time
as annual earnings
Examines the
association between
changes in
depreciation and the
tax treatment of
depreciable assets

Sample
• 190 companies that
changed to LIFO from
1979-1989

Main Variables
IV:
• Earnings effect of LIFO change
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

Key Findings
• The average return after LIFO change
announcements is not significant.
• The market response to LIFO changes disclosed at
the earnings announcement differs from that of other
LIFO changes.

• 232 companies that
changed depreciation
methods from 19721994

IVs:
• ROA
• Leverage
• Current ratio
DV:
• Income-increasing changes

• Tax law removed book and tax depreciation links.
• The frequency of income-increasing depreciation
method changes declines after the 1981 tax law.
• Companies making income-increasing depreciation
changes for all assets have worse performance than
companies making changes for new assets only.

Panel B: Literature on Company and Industry (Section 3.2)
Author
(Date)a
Bremser
(1975)****

Lilien,
Mellman, and
Pastena
(1988)****

Focus of Study
Sample
Compares earnings
• 80 companies with
for voluntary change
accounting method
companies to control
changes from 1965-1970
companies
• 80 control companies
Examines whether
accounting changes
can be used to mask
performance
problems

• 46 companies ranked in
the top two and 46
ranked in the bottom two
in industry shareholder
return from 1974-1983

Main Variables
IVs:
• EPS
• ROI
DV:
• Voluntary changes
IV:
• Successful companies
DV:
• Income-increasing and incomedecreasing accounting changes

Key Findings
• Companies reporting accounting changes have lower
EPS and lower ROI than companies that do not report
accounting changes.
• 81% of accounting changes are income-increasing.
• Unsuccessful companies are more likely to make
income-increasing accounting changes.
• The same results hold for companies in the top half
as well as for companies in the bottom half of the
Fortune 500 in terms of size.

Panel C: Literature on Economy (Section 3.3)
Author
(Date)a
Frishkoff
(1970)***

Focus of Study
Provides
descriptive
evidence on
voluntary changes

Sample
• Approximately 4,500
companies reported in
Earnings Digest column
in Wall Street Journal
from 1967-1969

Main Variables
IV:
• Year
DVs:
• Number of voluntary changes
• Issue type
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Key Findings
• There is an increase in voluntary changes overall and
in income-increasing changes.
• Depreciation changes increased threefold from 19671969.
• Companies make changes to reduce income
decreases amidst economic uncertainty and inflation.

Author
(Date)a
Dopuch and
Pincus (1988)
Pincus and
Wasley
(1994)***

Focus of Study
Sample
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel A

Main Variables

Key Findings

See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel A

Panel D: Literature on Managerial Contracts, Debt Contracts, and Financial Distress (Section 3.4)
Author
(Date)a
Moore
(1973)*

Smith
(1976)**

Salamon and
Smith
(1979)**

Holthausen
(1981)

Focus of Study
Sample
Studies whether
• 36 companies with
manager changes
manager changes from
are related to
1966-1969
income-decreasing • 200 control companies
discretionary
changes
Examines whether • 110 randomly selected
manager controlled
NYSE companies from
companies make
1954-1962
voluntary changes
that smooth income
Examines whether • 64 companies randomly
manager controlled
selected from the 1955
companies change
U.S. Senate Staff Report
accounting policies
on Factors Affecting the
to misrepresent
Stock Market for 1954performance
1962
Examines whether • 139 companies that
debt covenants and
changed from accelerated
manager
to straight-line
compensation plans
depreciation for book
are associated with
purposes only from
depreciation
1955-1978
method changes
and their effects on
stock prices

Main Variables
IV:
• Changes in management
DV:
• Discretionary changes

IV:
• Manager controlled companies
DVs:
• Earnings smoothing
• Proportion of changes used to
smooth income
IVs:
• Accounting changes
• Manager controlled companies
DVs:
• Analyst forecast error
• Cumulative abnormal returns
IVs:
• Bonus plan based on earnings
• Effect of depreciation change
on EPS
• Deviation from dividend
constraint
• Company size
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns
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Key Findings
• 23 of the 36 companies with manager changes have
income-decreasing accounting changes.
• Manager change companies make more types of
accounting changes and larger accounting changes.
• Companies with manager changes are more likely to
take a bath in the year of the change.
• The policy decisions made by manager controlled
companies smooth income more often.

• Manager controlled companies have fewer change
years in which forecast error and abnormal return
signs align.
• There is an association between accounting change
timing and abnormal stock returns for manager
controlled companies.
• Abnormal returns for switching companies are not
significant immediately after the switch.
• Abnormal performance is not related to the existence
of a management bonus plan, the effect of
depreciation changes on earnings, deviations from
dividend constraints, or company size.
• Debt covenants and management bonus plans are not
determinants of changes from accelerated to straightline depreciation.

Author
(Date)a
Schwartz
(1982)****

Focus of Study
Investigates
whether companies
with uncertain
solvency use
voluntary changes
to influence market
perceptions

Sample
• 163 companies facing
possible insolvency from
1974-1980
• 163 control companies

Examines the effect
of changes from
FIFO to LIFO on
CEO compensation
Examines potential
determinants other
than tax savings for
inventory method
changes

• 88 companies switching
to LIFO in 1974
• 88 control companies

AbdelKhalik, Chi,
and Ghicas
(1987)***
Healy, Kang,
and Palepu
(1987)

Examines the effect
of changes on
management
compensation
Examines the effect
of accounting
procedure changes
on CEO cash
compensation

Moses (1987)

Investigates
whether
discretionary
changes are used
for smoothing

• 74 LIFO switch
companies in 1974-1975
• 63 companies that
maintained FIFO
• 52 companies changing
from FIFO to LIFO from
1970-1976
• 38 companies changing
from accelerated to
straight-line depreciation
from 1967-1974
• 87 control companies
• 212 companies that made
discretionary accounting
changes from 1975-1980

Abdel-Khalik
(1985)

Hunt (1985)

• 191 companies that
switched to LIFO in
1974-1975
• 191 control companies

Main Variables
IVs:
• Bond downgrades
• Premium interest rates
• Bankruptcy model predictions
• Bankruptcy filings
DV:
• Voluntary changes
IV:
• Changes from FIFO to LIFO
DV:
• Annual CEO pay
IVs:
• Manager bonus plan
• Close to covenant constraints
• Manager ownership percentage
DV:
• Changes to LIFO
IV:
• Income effect of changes
DV:
• Salary plus bonus
IV:
• Earnings effect of accounting
change as a percentage of
earnings before the change
DV:
• CEO salary plus bonus

Key Findings
• Of the companies facing insolvency, 40% make a
material change with most being income-increasing.
• Distressed companies make more than twice as many
voluntary changes and four times as many incomeincreasing changes as healthy companies.

IVs:
• Sales
• Bonus compensation
• Earnings uncertainty
DV:
• Amount of change relative to
expected earnings

• Managers make tradeoffs between accounting change
effects and both the level of earnings and earnings
variability.
• Smoothing is associated with company size,
existence of bonus plans, earnings surprise, and the
directional impact of changes on earnings.
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• LIFO changes do not impact CEO compensation.
• LIFO-switch companies revise CEO bonus pay to
reflect the effect of the LIFO change on income.
• Companies with a manager bonus plan are no more
likely to switch to LIFO.
• Companies with ratios closer to violating debt
covenants do not switch to LIFO.
• Companies with lower levels of manager ownership
switch to LIFO.
• LIFO-switch companies have greater than expected
executive compensation in the year of change.
• The increase in abnormal compensation is positively
correlated with cash flow effects of LIFO changes.
• There is a positive relation between CEO
compensation and earnings for companies with LIFO
and depreciation changes.
• The effect of inventory and depreciation changes on
CEO compensation are smaller than industry- and
market-wide economic changes.

Author
(Date)a
Johnson and
Ramanan
(1988)

Elliott and
Philbrick
(1990)***

Focus of Study
Sample
Studies differences • 19 companies switching
between companies
from successful efforts to
changing to full
full cost accounting from
cost accounting and
1970-1976
those retaining
• 55 successful efforts
successful efforts
control companies
Examines analysts’ • 500 companies that made
forecasts for
accounting changes from
companies that
1976-1984
make changes

Labelle
(1990)

Investigates the
association
between debt
covenant
constraints and
voluntary changes

• 183 Canadian companies
reporting voluntary
changes from 1979-1982
• A group of control
companies

Ramanan and
Balachandran
(1993)

Studies executive
compensation when
companies elect to
capitalize interest
on construction
projects
Examines the
relation between
voluntary changes
and accountingbased debt
covenant violations
Examines how
excluding
accounting changes
from covenant
calculations affects
loan interest rates

• 45 companies that
changed to capitalizing
interest on long-term
construction projects
from 1966-1974
• 45 control companies
• 130 manufacturing
companies that were
first-time violators of
debt covenants from
1980-1989

Sweeney
(1994)***

Beatty,
Ramesh, and
Weber
(2002)***

• 206 new private loans
from 1994-1996

Main Variables
IVs:
• Debt covenant proximity
• Exploration intensity
• Size
DV:
• Changes to full cost accounting
IV:
• Effect of change on EPS
DVs:
• Analysts’ forecast error
• Analysts’ forecast revision
• Analysts’ forecast dispersion
IVs:
• Debt covenant limit on leverage
• Interest coverage limit
• Dividend constraint
DVs:
• Income-increasing changes
• Income-decreasing changes
IV:
• Changes to capitalized interest
for construction projects
DVs:
• Excess executive compensation
• Capital expenditures
IV:
• Debt covenant violations
DV:
• Earnings effect of changes

IV:
• Exclusion of voluntary changes
for covenant calculations
DV:
• Loan interest rate
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Key Findings
• Companies that change to full cost accounting have
higher financial risk and exploration activity.
• Companies that change to full cost accounting also
have increases in debt financing.

• Forecast errors and dispersion are larger in change
years.
• Analysts do not fully revise forecasts for the effects
of accounting changes in the current year.
• The earnings effects of changes are negatively
associated with analysts’ forecast revisions.
• The interest coverage ratio is negatively associated
with income-increasing changes.

• Companies capitalizing interest do not reduce capital
expenditures related to construction projects.
• Companies that change to capitalizing interest
increase construction borrowing after the change.
• Cash compensation to top management increases in
the year of the change.
• Companies near covenant violations make more
income-, cash-, and non-cash-increasing changes.
• Companies violating covenants make more incomeincreasing changes in year of default than other years.
• Default costs and accounting flexibility are
determinants of accounting responses to violations.
• Excluding voluntary changes from covenant
calculations decreases average rate by 84 basis
points.
• Excluding mandatory changes from covenant
calculations decreases average rate by 71 basis
points.

Author
(Date)a
Beatty and
Weber (2003)

Focus of Study
Examines whether
debt contract
features affect
method choices

Sample
• 125 companies with
material bank debt that
made voluntary changes
from 1995-2000

Main Variables
IV:
• Changes allowed in calculations
DV:
• Income-increasing changes

Key Findings
• Borrowers with loans that allow voluntary changes
are more likely to make income-increasing changes.
• Results only hold for loans that have dividend
restrictions and performance-pricing provisions.

Panel E: Literature on Industry Peers (Section 3.5)
Author
(Date)a
Pincus and
Wasley
(1994)***

Focus of Study
Sample
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel A

Main Variables

Key Findings

Panel F: Literature on Audit Firm (Section 3.6)
Author
(Date)a
Gosman
(1973)***

Eggleton,
Penman, and
Twombly
(1976)

Focus of Study
Sample
Studies differences • 100 companies randomly
between companies
selected in 1969 with
making voluntary
sample period from
changes and those
1959-1968
that do not
Provides evidence
on various factors
associated with
voluntary changes

• 161 companies that
changed to or from LIFO
from 1946-1966
• Same as used in Sunder
(1973) plus 6 companies

Main Variables
IVs:
• Size
• Industry classification
• Auditor
DV:
• Consistency qualifications
IVs:
• Personnel changes
• Industry
• Auditor
DV:
• Changes to or from LIFO

Key Findings
• Companies with consistency qualifications are larger.
• There are no differences by industry.
• Companies with consistency qualifications are less
likely to use Lybrand, Ross Bros., & Montgomery as
auditor.
• Changes in management are associated with switches
away from LIFO but not to LIFO.
• LIFO-switch results are different across industries.
• Changes to or from LIFO are more likely for Price
Waterhouse and Ernst & Ernst clients.

Panel G: Literature on Stock Market Reactions (Section 3.7)
Author
(Date)a
Ball (1972)

Focus of Study
Examines the
market response to
voluntary changes

Sample
• 197 companies (267
changes) that changed
accounting techniques
from 1947-1960

Main Variables
IV:
• Changes in accounting
techniques
DV:
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Key Findings
• The market does not respond to changes in accounting
techniques.

Author
(Date)a

Baskin
(1972)***

Kaplan and
Roll
(1972)***

Sunder
(1973)

Sunder
(1975)

Harrison
(1977)***

Abdel-Khalik
and
McKeown
(1978)

Focus of Study

Sample

Examines
• 135 companies that
information content
changed techniques from
of auditor
1965-1968
consistency
• 135 control companies
paragraph
Examines the
• 71 companies that
market effect of
changed from accelerated
depreciation
to straight-line
method changes
depreciation from 19621968
Analyzes
• 155 companies that
voluntary inventory
changed to or from LIFO
costing changes
from 1946-1966
and stock prices
Analyzes voluntary • Same sample as used in
inventory costing
Sunder (1973)
changes and stock
prices while
considering risk
Examines
• 280 companies with
differences in
accounting changes from
market responses to
1968-1972
discretionary and
nondiscretionary
accounting changes
Examines stock
• 107 companies switching
returns around
to LIFO in 1974-1975
changes to LIFO
• 107 control companies
and whether returns
are affected by
expected
performance

Main Variables
• Cumulative abnormal returns

IV:
• Changes in auditor’s report
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

Key Findings
• The market reaction to income changes caused by
changes in accounting techniques is different from the
reaction caused by typical changes in income.
• The consistency exception paragraph in the auditor’s
report does not have information content for investors.

IV:
• Changes from accelerated to
straight-line depreciation
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns
IV:
• Changes to or from LIFO
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns
IV:
• Changes to or from LIFO
DVs:
• Relative stock risk
• Cumulative abnormal returns
adjusted for relative risk
IVs:
• Discretionary changes
• Nondiscretionary changes
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

• Companies that change from accelerated to straightline depreciation are poor performers.
• Depreciation method changes to straight-line
temporarily boost stock prices in the short term but the
effect is not significant.
• There is a positive abnormal return in the 12 months
prior to, but not after, a LIFO change.
• No association found between stock returns and
changes from LIFO to FIFO.
• There is a positive risk-adjusted abnormal return in the
12 months prior to, but not after, a LIFO change.
• Changes to LIFO are associated with an increase in the
relative risk of stocks.
• No association found between stock returns and
changes from LIFO to FIFO.
• Income-increasing discretionary accounting changes
are associated with negative stock returns.
• Income-increasing nondiscretionary accounting
changes are associated with positive stock returns.

IVs:
• Changes to LIFO
• Analysts’ expected EPS growth
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

• No relation between effects of changes to LIFO and
analysts’ EPS growth forecasts.
• The effect of LIFO changes on stock returns depends
on expectations for the change in EPS.
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Author
(Date)a
Brown (1980)

Focus of Study
Analyzes the shortterm market
reaction to changes
to LIFO

Sample
• 86 companies that
changed to LIFO from
1974-1975
• 73 control companies

Holthausen
(1981)
Biddle and
Lindahl
(1982)

See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel D

Ricks (1982)

Provides evidence
• 275 companies that
on market reactions
switched to LIFO in
to LIFO adoptions
1974
• 275 control companies

Stevenson
(1987)

Provides evidence
on stock returns
associated with
changes to LIFO
Studies the market
reaction to the
announcement of
income-increasing
voluntary changes

Cheng and
Coulombe
(1993)

Dharan and
Lev
(1993)****

Examines stock
• 311 companies that
returns and firstadopted LIFO from
year tax savings
1972-1980
from LIFO changes

• 351 companies that
changed to LIFO from
1974-1975
• 77 companies that
announced incomeincreasing voluntary
changes (excluding
changes to LIFO) from
1977-1984

Examines
• 285 companies with
accounting changes
discretionary accounting
and stock returns
changes from 1978-1989
• 285 control companies

Main Variables
IVs:
• Changes to LIFO
• LIFO effect on EPS
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

Key Findings
• Returns decrease in the short-term after a change to
LIFO while returns for non-change companies
increase.

IV:
• Adoption year tax savings
realized from switch to LIFO
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns
IV:
• Changes to LIFO
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

• The magnitude of tax savings from LIFO adoptions in
1974 are positively associated with abnormal returns.
• LIFO adoption is negatively associated with changes
in systematic risk.

IV:
• Tax savings from LIFO switch
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns
IVs:
• Earnings effect of change
• Financial leverage
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

IV:
• Earnings effect of discretionary
changes
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns
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• Stock returns of LIFO change companies are lower
after the change but equal to returns of non-adopters
within 12 months.
• The difference in returns is largest in the week of the
preliminary earnings announcement.
• LIFO change companies experience an increase in
stock prices.
• Companies with greater financial adversity make
income-increasing changes.
• Abnormal returns in the announcement period of the
change are not different from zero.
• Abnormal returns after changes are positively
associated with unexpected earnings and negatively
associated with prior information about adversity.
• Associations are stronger for highly leveraged
companies and changes during non-recession periods.
• Changes do not impact current-year stock returns.
• Income-increasing changes are negatively associated
with returns in years after change.
• Five years after an income-decreasing change,
abnormal returns exceed the returns for companies
with income-increasing changes.

Author
(Date)a
Hand (1993)

Link, Lopez,
and Rees
(2007)****

Focus of Study
Analyzes the effect
of uncertainty
about changing to
LIFO on stock
returns
Studies long-run
stock performance
of voluntary change
companies and
changes in earnings
informativeness

Sample
• 821 companies that
changed to LIFO from
1974-1975
• 100 potential adopters of
LIFO
• 518 voluntary change
companies from 19822000
• 584 control companies

Main Variables
IV:
• Probability of a change to LIFO
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

Key Findings
• Companies considering a LIFO change that do adopt
have a negative abnormal stock return.
• Companies considering a LIFO change that do not
adopt have a positive abnormal stock return.

IV:
• Analysts’ forecast error
surrounding voluntary changes
DV:
• Cumulative abnormal returns

• Trading based on earnings effect of voluntary changes
does not generate abnormal returns.
• Voluntary changes do not change earnings
informativeness.

Panel H: Literature on Analysts (Section 3.8)
Author
(Date)a
Brown
(1983)***

Biddle and
Ricks (1988)

Elliott and
Philbrick
(1990)***

Focus of Study
Sample
Main Variables
Investigates
IV:
• 200 companies that
analysts’ ability to
changed accounting
• Accounting changes
forecast earnings
techniques from 1974DV:
for accounting
1979
• Analyst forecast error
change companies • 200 control companies
Examines whether • 394 companies that
IV:
Ricks (1982)
changed to LIFO from
• Changes to LIFO
results are due to
1973-1980
DVs:
analysts’ forecast
• Cumulative abnormal returns
errors
• Analysts’ forecast error
See the summary for this study in Table 1, Panel D.

Key Findings
• Analysts are less accurate forecasting one year ahead
earnings for companies with pension changes.
• Mandatory changes for SFAS Nos. 8 and 34 do not
affect forecast accuracy, but mandatory changes for
SFAS No. 13 improved forecast accuracy.
• Results for 1974 LIFO changes replicate Ricks (1982).
• Analysts overestimate earnings for change companies.
• Analyst forecast errors are correlated with excess
returns and earnings effects of LIFO changes.

Notes: a All studies in this table examine voluntary accounting changes. The following denote studies that clearly indicate their samples include accounting
techniques in addition to voluntary changes in accounting principle : **** includes changes in accounting estimates; *** includes mandatory accounting changes
and method changes for new standards; ** includes extraordinary items; and * includes write-offs, write-downs, and provisions for future losses.
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TABLE 2
Sample Selection and Company Industry
Panel A: Sample Selection
Sample
Total companies disclosing at least one voluntary change
Less: Compustat missing data
Less: Subsidiary companies
Sample of companies disclosing at least one voluntary change
Less: Companies disclosing changes without a cumulative effect or missing
cumulative effect information
Sample of companies disclosing at least one voluntary change with cumulative
effect information

Panel B: Voluntary Changes by Company Industry
Industry
Manufacturing
Retail
Computers
Utilities
Textiles, publish.
Transportation
Financial
Services
Chemicals
Food
Mining /construct.
Extractive
Insurance/real estate
Pharmaceuticals
Other
Total

Total
N
%
227 22.6
127 12.6
79 7.8
78 7.7
78 7.7
77 7.6
70 7.0
68 6.8
49 4.9
40 4.0
29 2.9
24 2.4
23 2.3
22 2.2
15 1.5
1,006 100.0

Notes: We define industry classifications according to Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998).
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VAC
1,315
248
61
1,006
402
604

TABLE 3
Frequency and Quantitative Materiality of Voluntary Changes
Pre-SOX/
Pre-SFAS 154

Post-SOX/
Pre-SFAS 154

Post-SOX/
Post-SFAS 154

Total
n = 1,006
52.9
60.0

Voluntary changes:
Avg. n per year
% of n disclosing an income effect

n = 359
51.3
79.1

n = 243
60.8
65.8 ***

n = 404
50.5
39.6 +++

Changes with a disclosed income effect:
% income-increasing
% income-decreasing

n = 284
48.2
51.8
100.0

n = 160
50.6
49.4
100.0

n = 160
46.9
53.1
100.0

n = 604
48.5
51.5
100.0

Quantitative materiality of income effect:
% of changes < 0.5% of sales
% of changes ≥0.5% and < 1.0% of sales
% of changes ≥1.0% and < 2.0% of sales
% of changes ≥2.0% of sales

n = 284
43.0
15.8
13.7
27.5
100.0

n = 160
51.3 *
18.1
10.6
20.0 *
100.0

n = 160
49.3
16.9
9.4
24.4
100.0

n = 604
46.8
16.7
11.8
24.7
100.0

Notes: We define the time periods as follows: pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 1995 to 2001; postSOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2002 to 2005; post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2006 to
2013. We measure “quantitative materiality” as the absolute value of the cumulative effect of the voluntary change
to prior periods divided by net sales × 100. Significance levels for differences in indicator variables are based on zstats from Wilcoxon rank sum tests. * and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10 and 0.01 level,
respectively, between the pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 periods. +++ indicates twotailed significance at the 0.01 level between the post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154
periods.
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TABLE 4
Voluntary Changes by Issue Type

Issue Type
Goodwill – Timing
Inventory – LIFO to FIFO
Revenue
Amort./Depreciation Expense
Pensions – Recognition
Assets – Capitalize to Expense
Inventory – Other Method
Classification
Inventory – Other Recognition
Assets – Expense to Capitalize
Estimation and Valuation
Pensions – Timing
Liabilities
Inventory – FIFO to LIFO
Complex Issues
Consolidation – Timing
Other
Assets – Other Recognition
Total

Pre-SOX/
Post-SOX/
Pre-SFAS 154 Pre-SFAS 154
N
%
N
%
0
0.0 27 11.1 ***
78
21.7 42 17.3
48
13.4 19
7.8 **
36
10.0 18
7.4
25
7.0
9
3.7 *
27
7.5 15
6.2
21
5.9 13
5.3
4
1.1 10
4.1 **
18
5.0 17
7.0
29
8.1
5
2.1 ***
22
6.1
8
3.3
8
2.2 23
9.5 ***
11
3.1 11
4.5
13
3.6
6
2.5
7
1.9
8
3.3
2
0.6
7
2.9 **
6
1.7
1
0.4
4
1.1
4
1.6
359
100.0 243 100.0

Post-SOX/
Post-SFAS 154
N
%
151 37.4 +++
48 11.9 +
11
2.7 +++
15
3.7 ++
28
6.9 +
19
4.7
26
6.5
43 10.7 +++
7
1.7 +++
6
1.5
5
1.2 +
2
0.5 +++
5
1.2 +++
5
1.2
8
2.0
11
2.7
12
3.0 ++
2
0.5
404 100.0

Total
N
%
178 17.7
168 16.7
78
7.7
69
6.9
62
6.1
61
6.0
60
6.0
57
5.7
42
4.1
40
4.0
35
3.5
33
3.3
27
2.7
24
2.4
23
2.3
20
2.0
19
1.9
10
1.0
1,006 100.0

Notes: We define the time periods as follows: pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 1995 to 2001; postSOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2002 to 2005; post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2006 to
2013. Issue type definitions and examples are located in Appendix A. Significance levels for differences in indicator
variables are based on z-stats from Wilcoxon rank sum tests. *, ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively, between the pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154
periods. +, ++ and +++ indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively, between the
post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 periods.
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TABLE 5
Voluntary Changes by Justification Type
Pre-SOX/
Pre-SFAS 154
Justification
N
%
Accounting Terms
235
42.0
Administrative
20
3.6
Peers
104
18.6
Conforming Policies
63
11.3
Response to Change
85
15.2
Other
52
9.3
Total
559 100.0
Total per VAC
1.58

Post-SOX/
Pre-SFAS 154
N
%
152
41.2
58
15.7 ***
46
12.5 **
58
15.7 **
30
8.1 ***
25
6.8
369 100.0
1.52

Post-SOX/
Post-SFAS 154
N
%
225
37.5
160
26.7 +++
78
13.0
86
14.3
21
3.5 +++
30
5.0
600 100.0
1.48

Total
N
%
612
40.0
238
15.6
228
14.9
207
13.6
136
8.9
107
7.0
1,528 100.0
1.54

Notes: Sample contains 1,528 justifications disclosed by 1,006 companies with voluntary changes. We define the
time periods as follows: pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 1995 to 2001; post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154
is the period from 2002 to 2005; post-SOX/post-SFAS No. 154 is the period from 2006 to 2013. Appendix B
presents definitions and examples of justification types. Significance levels for differences in indicator variables are
based on z-stats from Wilcoxon rank sum tests. ** and *** indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.05 and 0.01
level, respectively, between the pre-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 periods. +++
indicates two-tailed significance at the 0.01 level between the post-SOX/pre-SFAS No. 154 and post-SOX/postSFAS No. 154 periods.
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